An Orthodox friend of mine recently commented to me that he does not understand liberal Judaism: one should be “all” (defined as devoted to halakhic observance) or nothing. I somewhat irately responded that I don’t understand Orthodox Jews who cheat on their taxes or commit business fraud (which he decidedly does NOT do). He said he disapproves, but understands.
This exchange has been edging in and out of my consciousness for the past couple of weeks. His basic point, which deserves thinking about, was more about “secular” Jews, and the phenomenon of ethnic identity and pride: What does this mean in the multicultural mosaic of America? At the same time, it blatantly ignores the mass of evidence that points to the vibrancy of liberal Judaism and the ways in which Jews today structure a meaningful, “authentic,” Jewish life (cf. The Jew Within).
My comment to him, though, went to a somewhat different issue, that which is known to many academics as the “nomos and narrative” issue. Halakhic observance with no regard to the “narrative” – or ethical ideals – to which it is connected can potentially degenerate into the kind of practice condemned by the biblical prophets. Halakha, most modern rabbis would agree, is not disconnected to ethics, but the nature of that connection is often blurry. To let “ethics” drive halakha completely opens the possibility of juridical anarchy; who is the final arbiter of ethics?
This is precisely the issue behind Rabbi Yona Metzger’s condemnation of furs skinned from live animals, as reported by Orthomom yesterday. To what extent should the suffering of animals drive halakhah? The same question is at the fore of the new initiative of the Conservative movement to create an “tsedek hekhsher,” that adds to the halakhic requirements for kosher slaughter guidelines for the treatment of laborers. A little further afield is one of the accepted responsa of the Committee on Jewish Law and Standards on homosexuality: ethics (and human dignity) is explicitly invoked as a halakhic category.
This is notoriously slippery stuff; Rabbi Metzger, I would assume, would deride these two Conservative initiatives precisely because they use “extra halakhic” criteria. Others would criticize Rabbi Metzger’s position for stopping short of condemning the wearing of all fur. To me, these three (among countless other) small examples begin to illustrate the subtle interplay of factors involved in halakhic decision making.
